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INTRODUCTION

The Rhodesian rebellion against the British Crown, which began thirteen years ago, was universally condemned. The interna-

tional community, through the machinery of the United Nations,
isolated Rhodesia diplomatically and imposed mandatory economic sanctions. Nevertheless, Rhodesia continued to exist for

over a decade as an "outlaw state." No state, except South Africa,
recognized Rhodesia as a legal personality under international
law.
The most serious challenge that Rhodesia faced was the refusal
by the world community to recognize the legitimacy of the country's government. This policy of non-recognition in turn resulted
in the denial of international personality, and therefore of statehood under traditional precepts of international law for the entity
known as Rhodesia. The problem is compounded by the widely
held view that only the United Kingdom, as the colonial power,
can grant de jure independence (and, therefore, legal personality)
*
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to the territory. The United Kingdom, however, will only grant
such independence to a Rhodesian government with at least a
minimum degree of legitimacy.
Numerous unsuccessful conferences were geared to meet this
criterion of legitimacy. When such talks failed, legal stalemate returned and the status quo prevailed: recognition was withheld as
long as there was no acceptable government, and Rhodesia's
statehood and international personality remained in limbo. The
application of traditional principles of international law relating
to recognition results in denial of statehood and international
personality in situations similar to that of Rhodesia. The Rhodesian experience points out some conceptual defects in the traditional theories of recognition under international law. The major
defect in the traditional theories of recognition is the failure to
maintain a rigorous distinction between recognition of governments and recognition of states. The result of this confusion is
that international personality and, therefore statehood, is no
longer independent of recognition; rather, it has become a consequence of it. Recognition of government thus becomes a precondition to international personality. International personality, when
properly conceived, attaches to the state, not to the government.
This confusion leads to certain other anomalous results which
further illustrate the inadequacies of the traditional theories of
recognition.
Modifications of the traditional concepts of recognition will be
suggested where necessary not only to cover the particular case of
Rhodesia, but also to render a single, unified and conceptually
consistent theory of recognition that more accurately reflects
state practice.

II.

RE-EXAMINATION OF THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO
RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Under the traditional principles of international law, there are
two major theories on the nature, function and effect of recognition.1 The constitutive theory holds that the act of recognition
1. See generally G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 70-78. (5th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as SCHWARZENBERGER]; MANUAL OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 275-76 (M. Sorenson ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as
Sorenson]; J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 91, 149-81 (8th ed.
1967) [hereinafter cited as STARKE]; J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 138-43
(Waldock ed. 6th ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as BRIERLY].
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itself creates statehood, gives a new government authority to act
on the international plane and vests in the recognized state an
international personality making it a subject of international law.
The declaratory or evidentiary theory holds that statehood exists
independently of recognition. The act of recognition is merely a
formal acknowledgment of an established fact.
According to one authority, "the bulk of international practice
supports the evidentiary theory," although "recognition has often
been given for political reasons and therefore tended to be constitutive in character."'2 Other writers 3 support the constitutive theory.4 The controversy has never been resolved. The view that a
state's rights and duties in international law exist independently
of recognition, supports the declaratory theory. The judicial practice of many states, however, of denying an unrecognized state or
government full rights before domestic courts, underscores the
constitutive character of recognition. It is probable that "the
truth lies somewhere between these two theories." 5
Neither theory maintains a strict distinction between recognition of a state and recognition of a government, yet the advocates
of both theories assert that the recognition of a state is not the
same as the recognition of a government. Brierly states that "the
recognition of a new government is not to be confused with the
recognition of a new state but it raises problems in some respects
similar."6 Another writer notes that the recognition of a govern-1
ment "has nothing to do with the recognition of a State itself" 7
although "[i]t is practically impossible to lay down any definite
legal principles on the matter, so materially do political considerations usually impinge thereon, while the practice is, as may be
expected, confused and conflicting."'8 Brierly makes a similar
admission. 9
The only meaningful distinction between statehood and govern-

2. STARKE, supra note 1, at 153.
3. E.g., Schwarzenberger, Kelsen, and Lauterpacht.
4. See Sorenson, supra note 1, at 276. Lauterpacht, while supporting the
constitutive theory, asserts that every state has a legal duty to recognize a new
state if it fulfills the conditions of statehood. H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1947) [hereinafter cited as LAUTERPACHT].
5. STARKE, supra note 1, at 153.
6. BRIERLY, supra note 1, at 146.
7. STARKE, supra note 1, at 159.
8. Id.

9.

BRIERLY,

supra note 1, at 146.
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ment maintained under the traditional approaches to recognition
is in the proposition that international personality belongs to a
state and survives changes in government. This distinction, however, does not help in answering the more crucial questions of
how a new state can acquire international personality and how a
new government can acquire the capacity to act on the international plane.
Although traditional principles of international law purport to
distinguish between recognition of statehood and recognition of
governments, they leave to every state an absolute discretion to
grant or withhold recognition to states and governments. It is
clear that states apply identical political criteria in the grant of
either type of recognition. Thus, states treat the question of recognition of states in the same manner as any decision concerning
the recognition of governments. This pattern is apparent when
questions of recognition arise over a new government claiming to
represent a new state.
The constitutive or subjective element in the practice of recognition impedes all efforts to construct a single theory based on
objective criteria. The declaratory theory is an improvement on
the constitutive theory yet it too appears insufficient as it fails to
establish objective criteria for recognition. Its achievement is that
it lays down the principle that
[a] state may exist without being recognised, and if it does exist in
fact, then whether or not it has been formally recognised by other
states, it has the right to be treated by them as a state. The primary function of recognition is to acknowledge as a fact something
which has hitherto been uncertain, namely the independence of the
body claiming to be a state, and to declare the recognising state's
readiness to accept the normal consequences of that fact, namely
the usual courtesies of international intercourse. 10
The principal objection to this theory is that it combines the
two questions of recognition of state and of government. If the
purpose of recognition is merely to acknowledge a pre-existing situation, then the existence of statehood may be objectively verifiable.11 Under the declaratory theory, however, recognition is not
10. Id. at 139.
11. Although the declaratory theory makes no attempt to define a state, a
state as a person of international law has been defined under the Montevideo
Convention of 1933 on the Rights and Duties of States as possessing (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) a government which is effective
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only an acknowledgment of the existence of statehood, it also declares "the recognising state's readiness to accept the normal consequences of that fact (i.e., of statehood), namely the usual courtesies of international intercourse. ' ' 12 This latter part of the

thoery is not objectively verifiable. A state will enter into "the
usual courtesies of international intercourse" with another state
only if it recognizes that state's government. Neither the declaratory theory nor general international law establishes any objective
criteria for the recognition of a government, as opposed to a state.
The result is that recognition of governments is left to the absolute discretion of each government and the recognition of statehood impliedly remains subjective since the acquisition of international personality and the capacity to act on the international
plane remain conditional upon recognition of the government.13
Recognition under the declaratory theory is not "declaratory" of
the existence of international personality as a pre-existing fact,
but international personality is instead postulated as a consequence of recognition. In practice, states grant recognition only if
some kind of relations are to be established with the recognized
state. International personality is therefore granted in varying degrees. Schwarzenberger notes that
[t]he normal method for a new state to acquire international personality is to obtain recognition from existing states .... Until

the existing subjects of international law choose to transfer the
function of recognition of new subjects of international law to a
world authority, the effect of recognition is necessarily relative. It
is limited to the relations between the recognising and recognised
entities.
The scope
of the international personality granted is a matter of
4
intent.1

and which receives habitual obedience, and (d) a capacity to enter into relations
with other states. This Convention is, of course, not necessarily an authoritative
statement of the position under general international law, but it shows that a
"State" can be "objectively" defined. Another definition is that a state is a "definite territory of human society politically organised, independent of any other
existing state, and capable of observing the obligations of international law
S..
" Institute of International Law, Resolutions Concerning the Recognition
of New States and New Governments, art. 1, reprinted in 30 Am.J. INT'L L.
Supp. at 185 (1936).
12. BRERLY,supra note 1, at 139.
13. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 1, at 70.
14. Id. at 71-72.
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If one of the consequences of statehood is the acquisition of the
capacity to enter into international relations,1 5 and that capacity
is made contingent upon recognition of the government in question, there cannot be any real distinction between recognition of
states and of governments. Furthermore, if international personality is conditional upon recognition, it follows that the withdrawal of recognition should extinguish the legal personality of
the derecognized state. This would create confusion because of
constantly shifting and contradictory statuses depending on who
recognizes whom. Traditional international legal theory, perhaps
in order to avoid this difficulty, postulates that a withdrawal of
recognition does not extinguish personality. In circumventing the
difficulty, however, international law has to live with the uncomfortable paradox that while recognition confers personality, the
withdrawal of recognition does not extinguish it."'
The development of the law of recognition has focused on situations in'which there have been abrupt changes of government in
entities already recognized as states with international personality.17 Criteria for recognition of a government, such as "actual and
peaceful control,""8 stability or permanence, 9 have normally been
applied in only these situations. When applied to new and specific
situations, such as when a new government and a new state demand separate but simultaneous recognition, the traditional theories do not provide any clear answers. The Rhodesian case and
the case of Guinea Bissau illustrate the shortcomings of the traditional theories.
Starke raises the issue of the recognition of nascent states, but
summarily dismisses the question by saying that most states give
de facto recognition followed by de jure recognition. 20 However,
even the concept of de facto and de jure recognition is unable to
distinguish between recognition of States and of governments.
Thus: "When in the opinion of the recognising state a new regime
or authority meets some but not all the requirements which are
deemed essential before recognition should be granted, that state
15. Cf. note 11 supra.
16. For a further discussion, see text accompanying note 34 infra.
17. Tinoco Arbitration, 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 369 (1923); BRIERLY, supra
note 1, at 144-45. See also Sorenson, supra note 1, at 271; STARiKE, supra note 1,
at 135-36.
18. See Tinoco Arbitration, supra note 17.
19. STARKE, supra note 1, at 159.
20. Id.
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may grant de facto recognition."'" Similarly, Lauterpacht explains
that the purpose of de facto recognition is "a declaration that the
body claiming to be the Government of an established or a new
state actually wields effective authority without, however, satisfy2' 2
ing other conditions of full de jure recognition.
The concepts of de jure and de facto recognition speak primarfly to the recognition of governments of pre-existing states.'
Even if applied to a new state, the concepts are still concerned
with the recognition of government, awarded on the basis of the
effective authority and permanence of the government. Thus, says
Starke:
[Die facto recognition is purely a non-committal formula whereby
the recognising state acknowledges that there is a legal de jure government which "ought to possess the powers of sovereignty, though
at the time it may be deprived of them," but that there is a de
facto government "which is really in possession of them although
the possession may be wrongful or precarious."2 '
When the question of de facto or de jure recognition arises,
there is no threat or doubt as to the existence of the state as a
politically independent geographical entity, or indeed, as an international person.
III.

RHODESIA AND THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO RECOGNITION

The existence of an independent state of Rhodesia with international personality is debatable because the world community
considers illegal the act which purported to bring the state into
existence. Only an act of the British Parliament can grant de jure
independence to a British colony.2 5 It may, however, be argued
under the traditional approach that the Smith/Muzorewa regime
was a government requiring de facto recognition, and that the
British government, in negotiating the cease fire and elections arrangements with the Smith government as a party, recognized
that government as a de facto government. Further, the occasions
21. Sdrenson, supra note 1, at 279.
22. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 4, at 340.
23. See Aksionairnoye Obschestvo A.M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co. [1921]
3 K.B. 532, 543; STARK, supra note 1, at 139-41.
24. STARKE, supra note 1, at 163 (quoting Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 3 K.B. at
432).
25.
INT'L

Fawcett, Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia, [1965-66]BRIT. Y.B.

L. 102, 107 [hereinafter cited as Fawcett].
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on which the "front line" states have had contacts with the Smith
government demonstrate a similar de facto recognition. This argument would be valid only if the United Kingdom and the
"front line" countries regarded the Smith government as the (de
facto) government of an independent sovereign state of Rhodesia.
This they have refused to do, and it is generally accepted that
Rhodesia was a colony to which only the United Kingdom Parliament can grant independence. Further, insofar as the concept of
de facto and de jure recognition presupposes the existence of an
independent state and is concerned primarily with the recognition
of the government of such a state, 26 it is inadequate in explaining

a Rhodesia-type situation.
The question of the recognition of Rhodesia's government
arises only if there is a recognized state of Rhodesia. Yet the
traditional theories reverse the order of recognition since they regard the acquisition of international personality and, therefore,
statehood, as a consequence of recognition of government. Under
the "declaratory" theory of recognition a state may declare recognition of the "State" of Rhodesia and indicate its willingness to
27
enter into "the usual courtesies of international intercourse
with it, so that it may acquire international personality as of the
date of recognition.2 The result is the same under constitutive
theory. Recognition per se confers capacity on a government to
act on the international plane under the constitutive theory. A
"state" is then not only presumed to exist, but automatically acquires international personality. The lack of independent criteria
for recognition under the traditional theories results in the inability of either theory to maintain a proper distinction -between state
and government. Further, since the effect of recognition is relative, 9 the recognition of Rhodesia by one state and not another
would apparently render Rhodesia an international person and an
international non-entity at the same time.30 An unrecognized
26. For a discussion of de jure and de facto recognition, see text accompanying notes 20-24 supra.
27. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
28. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 1, at 70-72.

29. Recall that recognition is a matter of intent and has legal consequences
only between the recognizing and recognized states. See text accompanying note
14 supra.
30. Brierly sees this difficulty arising only with the constitutive theory.
BRIERLY, supra note 1, at 138. Insofar as the declaratory theory identifies the
acquisition of international personality as a consequence of the recognition of
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state, lacking international personality, has neither rights nor duties under international law. As Brierly warns, "some of the consequences of accepting that conclusion might be startling." 31 To
hold that an entity which has all the internal and external
properties of other states of the world community is not subject
to international law is hardly conducive to the promotion of the
international rule of law.
IV.

A

TENTATIVE RE-FORMULATION OF THE CONCEPT OF

RECOGNITION

A strict distinction between statehood and recognition of government is needed under international law. The Montevideo Convention provides that 2 an entity acquires statehood if three conditions are satisfied: a permanent population, a certain territory,
and an effective and independent government. Such an entity acquires all rights and duties under customary international law
and becomes capable of entering into legal relations with other
subjects of international law. Under these three criteria, the concept of statehood is objectively definable.
Under the traditional approach recognition is irrevocable.
Thus, a formal severance of diplomatic relations will not deprive
a state of international status.33 This results in an anomalous situation. If the purpose of recognition is to indicate the initiation of
international relations with the recognized state "it is a paradox
that when a gesture is made in a contrary sense, indicating that
no further relations will be maintained with the formerly recognized state or government, it is not in general attended by a withdrawal of recognition. '34 This paradox results from two factors:
the inability of the traditional theories to distinguish between
statehood and governorship; and the automatic implication of
recognition of statehood and international personality. If the acquisition of international personality is a consequence of recognition of government, it is indeed an anomaly that the withdrawal
of recognition does not cause the formerly recognized state to lose
its international personality.
government, however, the same difficulty arises under both the declaratory and
constitutive theories.

31.
32.

BRIERLY, supra note 1, at 138-39.

See note 11 supra.
STARKE, supra note 1, at 160.
34. Id.

33.

34
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If, however, one maintains a strict distinction between statehood and recognition of government, the above difficulties can be
avoided. A subject of international law could then exist independently of recognition, so that the acquisition of international personality would not be dependent on the act of recognition, and
the withdrawal of recognition could not affect that personality.
For example, the withdrawal of recognition by states such as
Zambia and Tanzania from the government of Idi Amin Dada did
not affect the status of Uganda as an international person. Similarly, the military coups in Ghana, Nigeria, the Sudan, the Congo,
Zaire, Chad, and Portugal, installed new governments in these
states; each retained its international personality and continued
unchallenged as a member of the United Nations.
Although an entity which satisfies the three conditions of statehood becomes entitled to certain international rights, the exercise
of each right is not entirely unfettered. As in all developed systems of municipal law, all rights have corresponding obligations. 35
A prisoner serving a jail sentence for murder cannot complain
that his incarceration has resulted in the loss of his guaranteed
freedom of movement. Similarly, the capacity or right of A to
enter into a contract with B is always dependent on B's willingness to contract with A. If B is unwilling A cannot complain of
any violation of his right to contract by B since the latter has
absolute discretion in the matter. The state, as an international
personality, is in an analogous position. It cannnot repudiate its
obligations and at the same time enjoy its rights without the demand for sanctions from other states. Likewise, the ability of the
state to enter into legal relations with other states is dependent
on the absolute discretion of these entities to treat with it.
At this stage the issue of the recognition of government arises.
Recognition of government is a discretionary act in the same way
as is the establishment of diplomatic relations. The absolute discretion that international law grants states with regard to recognition disposes states to act in accordance with their political interests. If a state refuses to have any relations with another state,
the latter has no grounds of complaint, unless of course there is
an infringement by the former of any of the latter's customary
rights-to the extent that state enjoys these rights. Some of these
35.

W.

PRUDENCE,

270, 287-88 (4th ed. 1967); R. DIAS, JURIS249 et. seq. (3d ed. 1970), for discussion of W. N. Hohfeld's scheme of
FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY

rights and duties.

RECOGNITION OF RHODESIA

Winter 19801

rights may be diminished or even extinguished if the law enforcement agencies of the world community have instituted measures
against a state to remedy breaches of international law that may
have been committed by it. Although the development of criteria
for the recognition of governments, in order to "de-politicize" the
practice of recognition, has been suggested, this may not be readily possible."6
Under the criteria of the Montevideo Convention the state of
Rhodesia existed prior to its recent independence because it had
a population, a defined territory and an effective and de facto independent government. These criteria are always objectively verifiable, and are evident from the history of Rhodesia traced from
1923 when Rhodesia became a self-governing colony up to the
time when it acquired a de facto independent status not unlike
that enjoyed by other sovereign states of the world. As will be
seen, this independent status was not created by the controversial
Declaration of Independence of 1965, but was created by other
independent factors.
V.

RHODESIA-TRANSITION

FROM COLONY TO STATE

Even though Rhodesia has had a defined territory, a population, and effective self-government since 1923, s" that date appears
too early for Rhodesia to be called a State. Although Rhodesia
had internal self-government, it did not have, nor did it ever purport to exercise, any powers in the external sphere. In this sense,
there was no "independent" self-government, de facto or de jure.
After the formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
in 1953, further progress was made in the evolution of self-government on the constitutional, as well as in the external, sphere.
The United Kingdom officially recognized the constitutional convention, agreeing that the British Parliament would not amend or
repeal any Federal Act or deal with any matter within the competence of the Federal legislature, or pass any legislation for selfgoverning colonies without their consent.38 The international
competence of the Federation was enlarged to include
36.

SCHWARZENBERGER,

supra note 1, at 71-72.

37. See Fawcett, supra note 25, at 103 et seq.
38. Joint Declaration of the British and Federal Governments, April 27,
1957, quoted in id. at 104. This position was reaffirmed by the U.K. Government
in 1961, and in 1963 at the United Nations. Fawcett, supra note 25, at 104.
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the right to conduct all relations and to exchange representatives
with Commonwealth countries without consultation with the
United Kingdom Government; the right to conduct all negotiations
and agreements with foreign countries subject to the need to safeguard the United Kingdom Government's international responsibilities; the right to appoint representatives to the diplomatic staffs
of H.M. embassies; the right to appoint its own diplomatic agents,
who will have full diplomatic status . . . in any foreign countries
prepared to accept them, and to receive such agents from other
countries; the right, on its own authority, to acquire the membership of international organisations for which it is eligible.39
Many of the above rights "are attributes of an independent
State."'4 0 After the dissolution of the Federation, the Rhodesian
government proceeded on the basis that its external powers were
the same as those of the Federation, with the Secretary of State
for Commonwealth Relations expressly accepting the position.4 '
Although Rhodesia did not purport to act as an independent sovereign State before 1965, "this result was to be attributed not to
lack of qualification of Rhodesia to be an independent state, but
to constitutional limitations accepted by it."'4 2 Rhodesia had,
therefore, acquired all the attributes of statehood well before
1965, and whatever limitations it accepted were rather insignificant when compared with its positive powers of self-government.
Further, even under traditional international law, a state is free
to impose as many self-limitations to its sovereignty as it wishes
without losing its statehood or international personality. Although Rhodesia did not actually proclaim or assert any sovereign
legal status, such status was not dependent either on its own acts
or the acts of any foreign government. The Declaration of Independence was, therefore, irrelevant to the acquisition of statehood
by Rhodesia. The absence of recognition from other states as to
either the state of Rhodesia or its government likewise had no
bearing on the statehood of the new entity. The ultimate responsibility of the United Kingdom Parliament over the Federation
was little more than a political device to retain some form of political association with the imperial Power. 43 After the dissolution

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Joint Declaration of 1957, quoted in Fawcett, supra note 25, at 105-06.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id.
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of the Federation, this "responsibility" over Rhodesia was progressively eroded, until it became no more than the mere assertion of a right.""
Even the absence of recognition of the state of Rhodesia from
the United Kingdom Parliament did not affect the issue of statehood. Earlier practice suggests that the absence of recognition
from the metropolitan country does not affect the statehood of a
rebellious colony. This question arose as early as 1811 in connection with British recognition of rebellious Spanish colonies in
Latin America. Chief Justice Best said:
I take the rule to be this-if a body of persons assemble together
to protect themselves, and support their own independence and
make laws and have courts of justice, that is evidence of their being a state .... It makes no difference whether they formerly belonged to Spain, if they do not continue to acknowledge it, and are
in possession of a force sufficient to support themselves in opposition to it.45
Similarly, Lauterpacht, summarizing the traditional practice,
maintains that
[the] refusal of the mother country to recognize such independence
is not conclusive. The legal title of the parent State is relevant to
the extent that clear evidence is required showing that the latter
has been definitely displaced and that the effectiveness of its au46
thority does not exceed a mere assertion of right.
During the currency of the Federation and still less after its
dissolution, United Kingdom responsibility over Rhodesia
amounted to no more than a mere assertion of a right. Therefore,
the absence of recognition of either statehood or government from
the imperial Parliament in these circumstances is not decisive of
the existence of the state of Rhodesia.
Similarly, the results of the London Conference, namely, the
dispatch of British Governor Soames to Rhodesia, and the order
of 11 December 1979, of the Rhodesian Parliament rescinding its
own previous declaration of independence and declaring Rhodesia
once more to be "a part of Her Majesty's dominions," does not
affect Rhodesia's statehood. Rhodesia had acquired statehood
44. Id. at 110-11.

45. Yrisarri v. Clement [1825] 2 C.& P. 223, reprinted in 1 B.I.L.C. at 70,
71.
46. LAUTERPACHT,supra note 4, at 26.
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before the 1965 declaration of independence; it became a state
while still a part of Her Majesty's dominions. Thus, the formal
return to that legal status for the sole and limited purpose of installing a new and more acceptable government cannot affect that
statehood.41
Applying the premise that a state is free to impose as many
self-limitations as it chooses, the latest acts of the Rhodesian Parliament must be seen as attributes of sovereignty rather than as
evidence of a lack of sovereignty. Rhodesia acquired these attributes of sovereignty through a slow process of evolution. These
acts, therefore, do not constitute the one and only definitive proof
of sovereignty, rather they constitute one of the many developments demonstrating Rhodesia's statehood. No act of the Rhodesian government or of the United Kingdom government declaring
Rhodesia to be a colony or declaring it to be independent can, by
itself, create or extinguish statehood.
VI.

RHODESIA AS A SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW

To avoid the difficulties of recognition in situations similar to
that of Rhodesia, it is preferable to hold that having satisfied the
three conditions of statehood regarding population, territory and
effective and independent government, there exists today the
state of Rhodesia. The legality of its government from the constitutional viewpoint of the parent state is irrelevant. International
law has not removed from the absolute discretion of each state
the question of the recognition of its government, except perhaps
in the sense that every state has a general duty in international
law not to promote or assist other states to commit breaches of
international law.
The state of Rhodesia may, therefore, be viewed as having had
not only the capacity to enter into relations with other states, but
also the rights which other states possess under customary international law. It must have been, therefore, eligible for membership in the United Nations provided it satisfied article four of the
United Nations Charter. Under this article, membership is open
to "states," but only those states which are "peace-loving" and
47.

At the time of writing Lord Soames' role is ill-defined. His primary task

appears to be overseeing the implementation of the cease-fire and ensuring free
elections. This mandate is limited in scope, time, and purpose, and at the time
of writing no iron-clad guarantees can be given to ensure the success of even this
minimal function of the British presence.
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which "accept the obligations contained in the [present] Charter
and, in the judgment of the Organisation, are able and willing to
carry out these obligations."" Although Rhodesia is a state, a
question may legitimately be raised as to its acceptance of Charter obligations, particularly respect for human rights and the
principle of self-determination.4 9 Further, the ability of a state to
observe Charter obligations is a question which is expressly left
within "the judgment of the Organisation" under article four, so
that the Organisation alone has the competence to decide the
membership question.
Since recognition of governments is discretionary, recognition is
often a matter of degree. Recognition may be absolute if the recognizing state acknowledges the recognized government as legitimately representing the state in question, or recognition may be
qualified if the recognizing state has reservations as to the recognized government's legitimacy or its stability and/or permanence.
The contracts between Zambia and Rhodesia in December 1974,
which ventually led to the Lusaka Accord, were of such limited
nature that they do not indicate readiness on the part of the
Zambian government to enter into normal or regular international
relations with Rhodesia.5 0 Indeed, even within the context of the
negotiations, Rhodesia acquired no international right against
Zambia. It must be acknowledged, however, that during the negotiations Zambia was dealing with the "state of Rhodesia," as was
the United Kingdom during the numerous occasions when it has
tried to promote a negotiated settlement. The existence of this
state was not determined by any act of recognition or non-recognition from a foreign State or by any act of the government
within the new State declaring itself "independent."
If Rhodesia had the attributes of a state and was, therefore, an
international person, it was obligated by the same regime of
rights and correlative duties as all other subjects of international
law. Rhodesia has the capacity to enter into relations with other
states to the extent that the latter are willing to transact with it.
As a subject of international law, other subjects could have demanded of Rhodesia compliance with rules of international law

48. U.N.

CHARTER

art. 4.

49. Id. art 1, paras. 2, 3.
50. The contacts were designed to secure the release of political prisoners in
Rhodesia and to bring about a cease-fire. Although an "accord" was reached, it
was never implemented.
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essential to the maintenance of a minimum world order. Neither
the Smith government, nor the Smith-Muzorewa government,
met this minimum standard.
The principle of self-determination and respect for human
rights has in recent times acquired normative status in international law for the breach of which the international community
may take remedial action in order to maintain at least the minimum order of world justice. It can be argued that minority rule is
inconsistent with the principle of self-determination and a contravention of human rights insofar as it is postulated on racial
domination by six percent of the population over the remaining
94 percent in all aspects of state work and law. Lauterpacht has
said that "human rights and freedoms, having become the subject
of a solemn international obligation

.

.

are no longer a matter

which is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction [of states]
. ."5
1
and that under international law "the correlation between
peace and observance of fundamental human rights is now a generally recognised fact. The circumstance that the legal duty to respect fundamental human rights has become part and parcel of
the new international system upon which
peace depends, adds
5' 2
emphasis to that intimate connection.

According to McDougal and Reisman, "the intimate nexus between human rights and minimum world order is clearly articulated in article 55 of the [United Nations] Charter . . . ,,5' The
authors maintain that not only is the policy of mandatory economic sanctions, imposed by the international community against
Rhodesia, justified under international law, but that the community would under international law be justified in taking any further measures against it through the United Nations. Such action
would be either under chapter VII of the Charter or as part of
"the coercive strategies of humanitarian intervention.

'54

The au-

thors maintain that each state possesses the right of5 humanitarian intervention under customary international law.
The Security Council of the United Nations, acting under arti51.

H.

LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS

178 (1950).

52. Id. at 186.
53. McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of InternationalConcern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 12 n.50. (1968). See also B.
MURTY, PROPAGANDA AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 83 n.16 (1968).

54. McDougal & Reisman, supra note 53, at 6-10.
55. Id. at 11-12; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 51, at 120.
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cle 39 of the Charter, found as early as 1966 that the Rhodesian
situation constituted a "threat to the peace. ' 56 It has been argued 57 that a determination of a "threat" to peace is sufficient for
the United Nations to compel its members under article 25 of the
Charter to take preventive measures against the offending
state-measures which under article 2(6) may be applied to nonmember states "so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of
international peace and security."
VII.

CONCLUSION

The traditional theories of recognition do not properly maintain the essential distinction between state and government. The
only proper way to maintain this distinction is by laying down
verifiable criteria for statehood, and treating the recognition of
governments as purely discretionary. A state must have come into
existence before the question of recognition of a particular government can arise. International personality is a consequence of
statehood, not of recognition; if a state can objectively come into
existence, so can international personality, and the grant or withdrawal of recognition cannot affect that personality.
The degree of recognition conferred by the United Kingdom
and other countries on Rhodesia on various occasions was limited
in scope, purpose, and time, and was not indicative of any opinion
that the Smith government or the Smith/Muzorewa government
was the legitimate government of Rhodesia; nor did such qualified
recognition demonstrate any intention to have normal relations
with Rhodesia. It would seem proper to view this as a question of
recognition of a de facto governing authority. Rhodesia must,
therefore, be regarded as a state with international legal personality. As such, it is bound by international law, like any other state,
and is subject to the usual range of penal sanctions available to
the international community to counter any breach of international law.

56. Sec. Council Res. 221, April 9, 1966; Sec. Council Res. 232, Dec. 16, 1966.
57. McDougal & Reisman, supra note 53, at 8-11; see also Hadderman, Some
Legal Aspects of Sanctions in the Rhodesian Case, 17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 672
(1968).

